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THE NEW NORTH DAKOTA SLAYER STATUTE: 
DOES IT CAUSE A CRIMINAL FORFEITURE? 
BRADLEY MYERS* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The obituary notice for Enolf Snortland listed his son Robert as one of 
his survivors.1  The family knew what the community would soon learn—
Robert had shot his father.  The personal issues that could cause a minor 
fight over a dog chasing sheep to turn into a homicide would never be un-
covered.  The killing resulted in years of news coverage while authorities 
searched for Robert, not always with the support of the victim’s family.2  
Authorities recovered Robert’s body not far from the murder scene seven 
years later.3 
Thirty years later, however, the killing of Enolf Snortland served as 
one of the motivations for a change to the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) as 
adopted in North Dakota.4  Enolf Snortland’s estate included property that 
he and Robert held in joint tenancy.5  Applying the UPC as then effective in 
North Dakota, the district court ruled that the joint tenancy property was 
severed into equal shares of tenancy in common property, with Enolf 
Snortland’s estate taking one share and Robert taking the other.6  Some 
legislators expressed amazement that this was the result under the law.7  
The court also ruled that Robert’s son, Robbie, would receive the intestate 
 
 *Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law.  J.D., University of 
Oregon School of Law; LL.M., in Taxation, New York University School of Law; M.S., 
University of California, Los Angeles; B.S., University of California, Los Angeles.  Thank you to 
Stephanie Jongeward for her invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article. 
1. ROGER SNORTLAND, FROM GRAYSTONE TO TOMBSTONE 114, 120 (McCleery & Sons 
Publ’g 2002). 
2. Id. at 147-48. 
3. The condition of the body made it impossible to determine either a date or a cause of 
death.  The cause of death was listed as exposure and the family used the date of the killing as 
Robert’s date of death on his headstone.  Id. at 150-51. 
4. The UPC is adopted in North Dakota as North Dakota Century Code Title 30. 
5. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
6. The property consisted of two quarters, so the court partitioned the property and gave one 
share to the estate of Enolf Snortland outright and ordered the other share held by a conservator 
for Robert.  SNORTLAND, supra note 1, at 121-22; In re Estate of Snortland, 311 N.W.2d 36, 37 
(N.D. 1981).  At the time of the supreme court’s decision the whereabouts of Robert Snortland 
were unknown.  See SNORTLAND, supra note 1, at 150. 
7. Janell Cole, Lawmaker Pushes for “Slayer Statute,” GRAND FORKS HERALD, Mar. 4, 
2007, at 1A. 
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share that Robert would have inherited.8  The change adopted by the legis-
lature reverses the first of these results by changing the treatment of joint 
tenancy property when one of the joint tenants kills another. 
Equity has laid out the principle that no person should be allowed to 
profit from his or her wrongdoing.9  Application of the Principle of Public 
Policy is often fairly easy.  For example, there is no question that a thief is 
not entitled to keep the items stolen.  Criminals can also be required to for-
feit property acquired with the proceeds of criminal activity, used to 
facilitate a criminal offense or offered to others as an inducement to commit 
a criminal offense.10 
Application of the Principle of Public Policy is more challenging, how-
ever, when the lives and property of the victim and the criminal are inter-
twined.  Several situations exist where the death of one person will lead to 
property passing to another by operation of law.  When the property passes 
by intestacy or by will, the transfer is covered by probate law.11  When the 
property passes via some non-probate mechanism, the transfer is covered by 
general principles of property law.12  Absent some exception, probate law 
will pass the property of a victim to a killer if the relationship between the 
parties would cause the property to pass by intestacy or if the killer is 
named in the victim’s will.13  A killer can also take property owned by the 
victim outside of probate if the ownership of the property provides for such 
a transfer.14 
 
8. Under North Dakota Century Code Sections 30.1-04-02 and 30.1-04-03, Enolf Snortland’s 
surviving spouse Mae received the first $50,000 of the estate plus one half of the remainder.  The 
other one-half of the remainder passed to Enolf Snortland’s children by representation.  Because 
Robert was treated as having predeceased under North Dakota Century Code Section 30.1-10-
03(1), Robbie received  the one-fifth share of the estate that would have passed to Robert.  In re 
Estate of Snortland, 311 N.W.2d at 39. 
9. For a review of the historical development of the Principle of Public Policy, see generally 
Alison Reppy, The Slayer’s Bounty—History of Problem in Anglo-American Law, 19 N.Y.U. L. 
Q. REV. 229 (1942).  The equitable principle shall be referred to in this paper as the “Principle of 
Public Policy.”  See id. at 241-42 (citing Amicable Soc’y v. Bolland, 4 Bligh (N.S.) 194, 5 Eng. 
Rep. 70 (1815)). 
10. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-31-1 (2007). 
11. Probate law is technically a subsection of property law.  For purposes of this article 
references to “property law” will refer to all areas of property law other than probate law. 
12. In some situations specific statutory schemes may have been adopted to take the transfer 
out of property law generally.  In others, the transfer of property may be covered by contract law 
(e.g., life insurance). 
13. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101,-103 (2006) (governing intestate succession); id. § 2-
602 (providing that a “will may provide for the passage of all property the testator owns at death 
and all property acquired by the estate after the testator’s death”). 
14. In addition to joint tenancy with right of survivorship, individuals can take property 
outside of property under a number of mechanisms, e.g., payable on death provisions.  See UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE §§ 6-101,-212 (2006). 
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The “slayer statute” is the application of the Principle of Public Policy 
when the property of a victim will pass to a killer because of the operation 
of property law.15  Under the slayer statute, generally, a killer is prevented 
from receiving property from the victim’s estate.  Slayer statutes operate in 
part by automatically doing on behalf of the victim those things that the 
victim could have done while still alive.  These include revoking gifts under 
a will or revocable trust, changing beneficiary designations under life insur-
ance or payable on death bank accounts, and voiding any fiduciary nomina-
tions made by the victim on behalf of the killer.16  When dealing with 
property that the killer owned by operation of law, courts have used con-
structive trusts to give equitable title to individuals other than the killer, 
while still giving legal title to the killer as required under probate or 
property law.17 
Joint tenancy property has presented a difficult situation in applying the 
Principle of Public Policy because, unlike the other situations governed by 
the slayer statute, the killer actually owns a property interest in the joint 
tenancy property.  A bedrock principle of modern law is that individuals 
should not be subject to forfeiture of their property simply because they 
committed a crime.18  Such forfeiture would be punishment for the crime 
and punishment is the province of the criminal law system.19 
North Dakota has long had a legislatively adopted slayer statute on the 
books.20  Prior to the recent change, the slayer statute provided that when 
 
15. For purposes of this article the term “slayer statute” will refer to all legal mechanisms 
that alter property or probate law to prevent a killer from succeeding to the property of a victim 
whether that mechanism is created by legislation or common law. 
16. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03 (1996).  In a similar manner, transfers from a 
decedent to a divorced spouse are also automatically revoked.  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 
(2006). 
17. See e.g., In re Cox’s Estate, 380 P.2d 584, 588-89 (Mont. 1962). 
18. Matthew B. Ford, Comment, Criminal Forfeiture and the Sixth Amendment’s Right to 
Jury Trial Post-Booker, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1371, 1403 (2007). 
Following ratification of the Constitution, attainder quickly went out of style.  The 
First Congress quickly banned the use of in personam forfeiture, attainder, and 
corruption of blood, and several states passed similar laws in the years thereafter.  
With the death of attainder, American legislatures effectively laid criminal forfeiture 
to rest for the next two centuries. 
Id. 
19. Forfeiture in this situation needs to be distinguished from forfeiture of property used in 
the furtherance of criminal activity.  Such forfeitures are considered in rem proceedings brought 
against the property itself.  The actions are thus not criminal in nature and not subject to the 
general protections available under the criminal law.  See State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, 
523 N.W. 2d 389, 392-94 (N.D. 1994). 
20. The first slayer statute in North Dakota was adopted in 1895: 
No person who has been finally convicted of feloniously causing the death of another 
shall take or receive any property or benefit by succession, will or otherwise, directly 
or indirectly by reason of the death of such person, but all property of the deceased 
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one joint tenant killed another, the joint tenancy was severed, with each 
party taking an equal share as tenants in common.21  The change adopted by 
the North Dakota Legislature alters this result by holding that the interest of 
the killer in the property becomes void.22 
The issue to be examined herein is the new North Dakota Slayer Statue 
and its consistency with general principles of equity and principles of law.  
This article will begin with a brief history of the slayer statutes, including 
their treatment under the Restatement of Property, the Uniform Probate 
Code and the North Dakota Century Code.  Next, the paper will review the 
nature of joint tenancy ownership of property.  A review of the historical 
treatment of criminal forfeiture will follow.  Finally, the new North Dakota 
slayer statute will be assessed as a criminal forfeiture for its compliance 
with the constitutional requirements for such forfeiture. 
II. SLAYER STATUTES 
Neither American nor English courts were extensively troubled with 
the issue of killers taking the property of their victims until the middle of 
the nineteenth century.23  However, a court actually confronted the issue as 
early as 1572.24  The likelihood that the killer would be put to death coupled 
with the legal concepts of attainder, forfeiture, and corruption of blood 
resulted in neither the killer nor the killer’s family inheriting any property 
from the victim.25  With the repeal of attainder, courts, and, eventually, 
legislatures needed to find some other legal doctrine to prevent killers from 
profiting from their crimes.  English courts did so by discovering the 
 
and all rights conditioned upon his death shall vest and be determined the same as if 
the person convicted was dead. 
REVISED CODES OF THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA § 3682 (1895).  The state adopted the UPC 
and its version of the slayer statute in 1972.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-04-23 (1972). 
21. “The intentional and felonious killing of the decedent: . . . (b) Severs the interests of the 
decedent and killer in property held by them at the time of the killing as joint tenants with the right 
of survivorship, transforming the interests of the decedent and killer into tenancies in common.”  
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03(3)(b) (1996). 
22. “The intentional and felonious killing of the decedent: . . . (b) Voids the interests of the 
killer in property held with the decedent at the time of the killing as joint tenants with the right of 
survivorship.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03(3)(b) (2007) [hereinafter, the new North Dakota 
slayer statute]. 
23. The history of the slayer statute relies heavily on the work of Reppy, supra note 9, at 
229. 
24. Reppy, supra note 9, at 229 (citing Brooke v. Warde, 3 Dyre 310b, 73 Eng. Rep. 702 
(1572)). 
25. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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Principle of Public Policy, “which forbade a criminal from profiting from 
his own wrong.”26 
Slayer statutes in the United States began first under common law 
interpretations of property law.  More recently, these common law rules 
have been codified.  Whether by court or legislature, the Principle of Public 
Policy is the driving equitable force behind the slayer statute. 
A. COMMON LAW 
The Supreme Court adopted in the 1886 case of Mutual Life Insurance 
Co. v. Armstrong27 the Principle of Public Policy into United States law.28  
The case involved a killer who took out a policy on the life of the victim 
with the intent of killing the victim to receive the insurance proceeds.  The 
Court held that as a matter of law one could not recover insurance money 
payable upon the death of a party whose life the killer had taken.29 
Beginning with Riggs v. Palmer,30 state courts began adopting the 
Principle of Public Policy into their common laws.31  The Principle of 
Public Policy allowed courts to prevent slayers from inheriting property in 
the absence of a legislatively adopted slayer statute.  The Restatement32 has 
attempted to reconcile these common law differences. 
The Restatement provides that a slayer must be “denied any right to 
benefit from the wrong.”33  The slayer’s motive in committing the wrong is 
irrelevant and application of the slayer statute does not require 
establishment of a financial motive in the slaying.34  The slayer statute 
 
26. “[T]he Court of Appeal in the Cleaver case . . . discovered and promulgated the ‘so-
called rule of public policy,’ which forbade a criminal from profiting from his own wrong.”  
Reppy, supra note 9, at 242 (quoting Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund L. Ass’n., 1 Q.B. 147 (C.A. 
1892)). 
27. 117 U.S. 591 (1886). 
28. Armstrong, 117 U.S. at 600 (1886) (citing the “common law maxim” ex turpis causa non 
action (no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong) as the justification for its 
ruling). 
29. Id. at 600. 
30. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).  The Riggs case concerned a man who killed his grandfather to 
hasten his inheritance under the grandfather’s will was prohibited from inheriting the property.  Id. 
at 191. 
31. Brian W. Underdahl, Creating a New Public Policy in Estate of O’Keefe: Judicial 
Legislation Using a Slayer Statute in a Novel Way, 44 S.D. L. REV. 828, 835-36 (1998). 
32. References to the “Restatement” will refer jointly to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 (2003) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF 
PROPERTY); and the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 188 (hereinafter RESTATEMENT 
OF RESTITUTION).  Both the Restatement of Property and the Restatement of Restitution deal with 
the application of the slayer statute and the analyses under both are the same. 
33. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 8.4(a); see also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 188 
cmt. a. 
34. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 8.4(a) cmt. b. 
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applies even if the property probably would have gone to the slayer 
eventually.35 
The Restatement recognizes that the slayer statute varies the results that 
would occur under normal property law rules and justifies this variation 
because the result is neither punitive, which is the function of criminal law, 
nor compensatory, which is the function of tort law.  Both these conclu-
sions, however, depend on the fact that the slayer statute “does not cause 
the killer to forfeit any of his or her own property . . . , but prevents the 
killer from benefiting from the wrong that he or she has committed.”36 
In most jurisdictions, the common law slayer statute has given way to a 
legislatively adopted slayer statute.37  The common law history, however, is 
still helpful for courts in interpreting the slayer statutes.38 
B. LEGISLATIVELY ADOPTED SLAYER STATUTES 
Starting in the early 1900s, a majority of states began adopting slayer 
statutes to govern the situation where a property of a victim will pass to his 
or her killer.39  The first attempt to bring uniformity to the area began with 
an article published by Professor John Wade of Harvard University.40  
Attempts at uniformity have continued through the work of the Uniform 
Law Commissioners.41  These statutes, whether crafted by legislatures or by 
others attempting to bring uniformity to the area of the law, have attempted 
to specifically provide for the situations in which the slayer statute will 
apply and what should happen to the property affected. 
 
35. Id. cmt. c; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 188 cmt. a (“[W]here it is doubtful whether 
or not he would have had an interest if he had not committed the murder, the chances are resolved 
against him.”). 
36. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 8.4 cmt. a; see also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION 
§ 188 cmt. a. 
37. Forty-three states have passed legislative slayer statutes.  Gregory Blackwell, Property: 
Creating a Slayer Statute Oklahomans Can Live With, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 143, 168 (2004).  Three 
states still use common law slayer statutes: Maryland, Missouri and New York.  Id. at 168-69 
(citing Prince v. Hitaffer, 165 A. 470 (Md. 1933); Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641, 648 (Mo. 
1908); and Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. App. Div. 1889)).  Two states, Massachusetts and 
New Hampshire, have neither a judicial nor a legislative slayer statute.  Id. 
38. This is particularly true for slayer statutes that provide that the killer will not inherit 
property from the victim, but which fail to define the terminology or provide any other practical 
guidance.  See, e.g., Bradley v. Fox, 129 N.E.2d 699, 703-05 (Ill. 1955). 
39. Forty-three states have passed legislative slayer statutes. Blackwell, supra note 37, at 
168; see also Julie J. Olenn, Comment, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: New York’s Slayer Rule and In re 
Estate of Covert, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1341, 1341 n.3 (2001). 
40. John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another—A Statutory 
Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715, 723 (1936).  Twenty-five states had already adopted slayer 
statutes by the time of Professor Wade’s article.  Id. at 715 n.1. 
41. The UPC was first promulgated in 1969.  It has been significantly amended on several 
occasions.  About one-third of the states have adopted all, or substantially all of at least part of the 
UPC.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUST AND ESTATES 60 (7th ed. 2005). 
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Drafting a statute to apply the Principle of Public Policy can be quite 
challenging because the equitable arguments vary depending on the facts 
surrounding the killing.42  Three general scenarios can be identified.  The 
first scenario is where a killer is motivated by the desire to take the property 
from the victim.  This can occur when the victim has made a will benefiting 
the killer and has threatened to change the will to disinherit the killer,43 
when the killer would inherit the property of the victim by intestacy,44 or 
when the killer and victim are joint properties of ownership with survivor-
ship.45  In all these cases the killing causes the victim to lose enjoyment of 
the property and denies the victim the opportunity to affect the distribution 
of his or her property.46 
The second scenario is killings where the fact that the killer inherits 
property from the victim either by inheritance, intestacy or survivorship 
plays no role in the motive for the killing.  This usually occurs when the 
victim and killer are members of the same family.47  These cases equally 
deprive the victims of the enjoyment of their property and control over its 
distribution.  While these cases do not involve the greed motivation that 
exists under the first scenario, the fact that the perpetrator will take owner-
ship of the victim’s property has served as justification for treating these 
two scenarios the same.48 
The third scenario involves killers who commit suicide immediately 
after killing the victim.  It can be assumed that under this scenario the killer 
is not motivated by a desire to receive the victim’s property.  Further, the 
killer will not actually receive any property, preventing any “profit” from 
the killing.  The question then becomes whether the slayer statute should be 
used to deny the killer’s heirs, who may also be relatives of the victim, from 
receiving property from the deceased. 
These shifting equitable considerations underlay the policy considera-
tions faced by drafters in constructing a slayer statute.  The more practical 
consideration, however, is how to provide sufficient guidance to the courts 
 
42. See Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L. 
REV. 489, 491-96 (1986). 
43. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189-90 (N.Y. 1889); Garwols v. Bankers’ Trust Co., 232 
N.W. 239, 239 (Mich. 1930). 
44. Peeples v. Corbett, 157 So. 510, 511 (Fla. 1934). 
45. In re Estate of Cox, 380 P.2d 584, 586 (Mont. 1963). 
46. See Fellows, supra note 42, at 493. 
47. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 363 N.E.2d 785, 785 (Ill. 1977) (wife killed estranged 
husband); Leavy, Taber, Schultz, & Bergdahl v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 581 P.2d 167, 168 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1978) (wife killed husband). 
48. However, the killing is much more likely under this second scenario to be treated as 
manslaughter, which could result in the inapplicability of the slayer statute. 
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who must administer the law.  In other words, how do we implement policy 
choices in structuring the slayer statute? 
C. THE STRUCTURE OF A SLAYER STATUTE 
The creation of a slayer statute, by either a court or a legislature, 
requires a resolution to three questions: Who is a slayer?  What property is 
lost?  And, who takes the property?49 
1. Who Is a Slayer? 
The slayer statute recommended by Professor Wade identified a killer 
as one whose act was willful and unlawful.50  The majority of states have 
accepted the standard presented in the UPC that the killing must be 
felonious and intentional.51  The Restatement uses the same language.52  
This definition limits the application of the slayer statute to murder and 
voluntary manslaughter.  A small minority of states include killings with a 
lower level of culpability.53  Clearly, however, one who might cause the 
death of another through negligence or some other non-criminal act will not 
have his chance to inherit affected by the slayer statute.54 
An extremely important aspect of slayer statutes is that they do not 
require that the killer be convicted of a crime.  While this makes sense in 
the abstract because of the great likelihood that in some cases the killer will 
not survive long enough to stand trial, it raises the distinct possibility that a 
person could be found not guilty of committing a murder, but still be 
 
49. See Blackwell, supra note 36, at 145.  Legislature must deal with these questions 
directly.  Court decisions are almost always limited to the facts before the court, making it 
difficult to find specific answers to these questions. 
50. Wade, supra note 40, at 721-22. 
51. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b) (amended 1997).  The effect of the UPC definition of 
slayer is that many people who take the lives of others will not be considered slayers.  Killers who 
are found to be insane, those whose acts were not intentional and those who killed in self-defense 
will not be affected by the application of the slayer statute.  Callie Kramer, Notes & Comments, 
Guilty by Association: Inadequacies in the Uniform Probate Code Slayer Statute, 19 N.Y. L. SCH. 
J. HUM. RTS. 697, 705-08 (2003). 
52. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 8.4(a).  The Restatement of Restitution Section 188 does 
not provide a standard but merely refers to the “murder” of the victim by the killer. 
53. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CINN. L. REV. 803, 
848 n.213 (1993) (citing the slayers statutes of Colorado, District of Columbia, Indiana and 
Oklahoma as referring to “manslaughter” and that the “criminal statutes of those jurisdictions 
characterize some unintentional homicides as manslaughter”).  One commentator has recom-
mended extending the slayer statute to elder abuse situations, even if the abuse was not 
responsible for the death of the victim.  Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family Property: A 
Proposal for Reform, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 401, 412-13 (1995). 
54. This does not mean, however, that the estate of a tort victim does not have a claim 
against the tortfeasor.  The extent the tortfeasor might inherit would be reduced by any recovery in 
the estate of decedent.  Julie Waller Hampton, Comment, The Need for a New Slayer Statute in 
North Carolina, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 295, 295 (2002). 
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prevented from inheriting from the victim because of a determination that a 
felonious and intentional killing took place.55  This is possible because the 
slayer statutes use a lower standard of proof than is required in a criminal 
trial.  The felonious and intentional killing only needs to be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence.56 
North Dakota had adopted the UPC definition and applies its slayer 
statute only to killers who have feloniously and intentionally killed their 
victims.  Further, because North Dakota’s criminal law contains the distinc-
tion between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, the state is among 
the majority of states that require voluntary action on the part of the killer.  
North Dakota has also adopted without change the UPC’s lower standard of 
proof in slayer cases and in allowing conviction of murder to be conclu-
sively proven that an individual is covered by the statute.57 
2. What Property Is Lost? 
Discussion of what property the killer loses requires consideration of 
the property affected.  One of the justifications for the slayer statute under 
the Restatement is the conclusion that the killer does not actually lose any 
of his own property.58  The killing of another causes disruption to the “nor-
mal” transfer of property in three ways: (1) the victim loses the enjoyment 
of the property; (2) the victim loses the ability to change the disposition of 
the property on death; and, (3) the “normal” order of death of the victim and 
the potential takers of the property becomes unascertainable.59  A slayer 
statute can do nothing to restore the victim’s enjoyment of the property, but 
it should attempt to ameliorate the other two disruptions to the extent 
possible.60 
One basic assumption under the slayer statute is that had the victims 
known that they would be killed, they would have elected to prevent the 
killers from inheriting any of their property.  The easiest method of 
 
55. A conviction that establishes felonious and intentional killing establishes the person as a 
killer for purposes of the UPC.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(g) (2006).  Some jurisdictions, 
however, allow the killer to relitigate his status as a killer, some even preventing the conviction 
from coming into evidence.  Blackwell, supra note 37, at 173. 
56. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(g) (2006). 
57. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03(7) (2007). 
58. The main purpose of this paper is dealing with the question of whether the change to the 
North Dakota slayer statute has changed this justification. 
59. Fellows, supra note 42, at 504. 
60. Id. at 504-05. 
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implementing this presumption is denying the killer of the right to receive 
property by intestacy or by will.61 
Much more challenging, however, is handling the non-probate methods 
of property transfer.  Some of the non-probate interests can be denied using 
the same reasoning and implementation as the probate transfers.  For exam-
ple, if the killer is the beneficiary of a revocable trust established by the 
victim, the killer can be denied any benefit under the trust by treating the 
killer’s interest in the trust as having been revoked.62  Similarly, killers can 
be denied the right to receive the proceeds of life insurance on their 
victims.63 
Other potential situations exist.  As a general rule, the slayer statutes 
deny property to the killer if the victim had a right to revoke the gift.64  
Slayer statutes do not, however, deny property to the killer when the victim 
did not have a right to revoke the transfer.65  This even includes situations 
where the victim could have altered the distribution of the property, but did 
not have a power to revoke.  For example, a donor names the killer the taker 
in default of a power of appointment and the victim the donee.  By killing 
the victim, the killer eliminates the only person who could deny him the 
property under the power of appointment, but the property did not belong to 
the victim and the designation of the killer as the taker in default is not in 
the discretion of the victim.66 
Dealing with the fact that the killing changed the order of deaths is 
more difficult.  While the fact that the killer might not have outlived the 
victim is dealt with by denying the killer the right to receive the victim’s 
property, the same rule will not help in dealing with the fact that others 
might have predeceased the victim or with property not actually owned by 
 
61. This result occurs not only in states with slayer statutes that specifically call for it, see 
Uniform Probate Code § 2-803, but also in states where it does not.  Wright v. Wright, 449 
S.W.2d 952, 953-54 (Ark. 1970) (involving a killer that was denied the right to take property by 
intestacy); Welch v. Welch, 252 A.2d 131, 133-34 (Del. Ch. 1969) (involving a killer that was 
denied the right to take property under the victim’s will). 
62. Because the trust is not under the jurisdiction of a court, it will be necessary for either the 
trustee or one of the other beneficiaries to ask a court to order the trustee not to provide any 
benefits to the killer. 
63. This is easily the case if the victim owned the policy and retained the right to change the 
beneficiary.  A more difficult question arises if the policy is owned by others.  UPC Section 2-
803(b) only revokes the designation of a killer on an insurance policy if the victim had the right to 
revoke the designation.  Courts in some jurisdictions have, however, declared it a violation of 
public policy for a killer to receive the proceeds of life insurance on a victim regardless of who 
owned the policy.  See, e.g., Merrity v. Prudential Ins. Co., 166 A. 335, 336 (N.J. 1933). 
64. The result can be affected either by treating the designation of the killer as being revoked 
or by treating the killer as having predeceased the event that would result in the killer receiving 
the property. 
65. See Fellows, supra note 42, at 504-10. 
66. Id. at 510. 
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the victim.  For example, suppose a third party created an irrevocable trust 
that paid income interests jointly to the victim and killer.  Here, the victim 
does not own the property, so the slayer statute should not apply.  However, 
suppose the gift further provides that the corpus of the trust will go to the 
survivor of the victim and killer.  Here, because the killing has determined 
who should take the property, the killer should be denied an interest to keep 
him from increasing his interest by committing the killing. 67  If the death of 
the victim has no impact on the ultimate receiver of the property, however, 
the slayer statute should not interfere.68 
Other than with respect to joint tenancy property, North Dakota has 
adopted the UPC’s position that denies killers the right to receive property 
from the estate of the victim by either will or intestacy and which revokes 
all revocable dispositions of property in favor of the killer.69  North Dakota 
has not, however, taken any actions amending its version of the UPC to deal 
with the other situations where a killer might take property controlled by 
someone other than the victim. 
3. Who Takes? 
The biggest issue underlying the question of who should take the 
property in lieu of the killer is whether the issue of the killer should be 
allowed to take the property.70  Although there is one example of a lower 
court preventing property from passing to relatives of the killer as well as 
the killer herself,71 the general rule provides that the wrongdoing on the part 
of the killer is not attributed to members of the killer’s family. 
The main arguments provided by those who consider that family 
members should also be denied property have largely failed to achieve 
traction in either the courts or in legislatures.  The family members are sim-
ply not guilty of any wrongdoing.  In most cases, the family members are 
also objects of the victim’s bounty as well.  The fact that a man kills his 
father does not lead to the conclusion that the victim would want to cut off 
his grandchildren.72 
It should be noted, however, that a court applying a common law slayer 
statute has prevented the heirs of a killer from receiving the victim’s 
 
67. The UPC version of the slayer statute would have no impact under this scenario, allowing 
the killer to keep the property.  See, e.g., Fellows, supra note 42, at 510-11. 
68. Id. at 511. 
69. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-10-03(3), 30.1-10-03(4) (2007). 
70. See Kramer, supra note 51, at 697-98. 
71. In re Estates of Covert, 761 N.E.2d 571, 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (denying property to 
relatives of a killer overturned on appeal). 
72. Kramer, supra note 51, at 714. 
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property.  In Cook v. Grierson,73 the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that 
the children of a slayer were prohibited from inheriting from the estate of 
the victim, their grandfather, under the common law slayer statute appli-
cable in the state.74  The decedent died intestate and the court ruled that the 
grandchildren could not take under the state’s intestacy statute because their 
father, the killer, was still alive.  The slayer statute disqualified their father 
from inheriting and the fact that the father was alive prevented the children 
from qualifying under the slayer statute.75 
North Dakota has adopted the UPC language that provides that 
property will pass as if the killer had predeceased the victim.76  Issue of the 
killer can step up and inherit from the victim under either intestacy or the 
application of the anti-lapse statute. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court dealt with this issue directly in the 
Snortland case.  The estate of the victim passed by intestacy.77  The per-
sonal representative argued that the heirs of the killer should be precluded 
from taking anything from the victim’s estate.  The court, however, held 
that the statute clearly provided that “while a killer is not entitled to share in 
his victim’s estate, the share he otherwise would have taken passes as 
though he had predeceased his victim.”78  Under the laws of intestacy, this 
means that the killer’s heirs will take the killer’s share of the estate by 
representation.  The North Dakota slayer statute does not affect the relation-
ship between the deceased victim and any person other than the killer.79 
 
73. 845 A.2d 1231 (Md. 2004). 
74. Cook, 845 A.2d at 1232.  Maryland does not have a legislative slayer statute.  Id. at 1233. 
75. If a slayer statute similar to the UPC version had been adopted in Maryland, then the 
killer would have been treated as predeceasing the victim and the grandchildren would have 
qualified under the intestacy statute in place in the state.  Tara L. Pehush, Maryland is Dying for A 
Slayer Statute: The Ineffectiveness of the Common Law Slayer Rule in Maryland, 35 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 271, 289-90 (2004). 
76. Under North Dakota Century Code Section 30.1-10-03(2) killers are treated as having 
disclaimed any interest as an intestate taker and under North Dakota Century Code Section 30.1-
10-03(5) other governing instruments are given effect as if the killer disclaimed all revoked 
provisions.  Disclaimers are governed by North Dakota Century Code Section 30.1-10.1-01-12 
and provides generally that disclaimants are treated as having predeceased. 
77. Under the intestacy statute in place at the time (North Dakota Century Code Section 
30.1-04-02) the victims surviving spouse received the first $50,000 of the estate and one-half of 
the balance.  The rest passed to the victim’s heirs by representation. 
78. North Dakota Century Code Section 30.1-10-03 only refers to the “individual who 
intentionally and feloniously kills the decedent” in application of the slayer statute.  Any rights of 
the issue of the killer will be decided based on the relationship of those individuals to the decedent 
and the terms of any governing instrument.  See In re Estate of Snortland, 311 N.W.2d 36, 39-40 
(N.D. 1981). 
79. Id. at 39 (citing the Editorial Board Comments to Title 30.1). 
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III. JOINT TENANCY AND THE SLAYER STATUTE 
A. THE NATURE OF JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY 
The new North Dakota slayer statute only differs from the UPC version 
in its treatment of property held by the victim and killer as joint tenants 
with right of survivorship.  Joint tenancy property has always presented a 
bit of a problem under the slayer statute because of the difficulty in untan-
gling the ownership interests of the killer and victim.  The presumption, 
outlined by the Restatement, is that a slayer statute should only be used to 
prevent a killer from receiving the property of the victim and joint tenancy 
property is owned, at least in part, by the killer. 
Joint tenancy is defined as ownership “by several persons in equal 
shares by a title created by a single will or transfer, when expressly declared 
in the will or transfer to be a joint tenancy.”80  Property held jointly that is 
not held in joint tenancy is held as tenants in common.81 
Joint tenants have the right of survivorship, meaning that no probate or 
other proceeding is necessary to pass the property to the surviving joint 
tenants on death.  This right was deemed to exist because the joint tenants, 
as a group, are deemed to own the property.  Under this theory, each of the 
joint tenants owns the undivided whole of the property.  When one member 
of the group dies, nothing transfers from the deceased to the other joint 
tenants.  Rather, the ownership of the property continues in the joint tenant 
group, albeit now reduced in number by the loss of the decedent.82 
Under the common law, joint tenancies required the existence of the 
“four unities” of interest, title, time, and possession to exist equally for all 
joint tenants at the same time.83  A failure in one of these unities would 
 
80. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-06 (2007). 
81. Id. § 47-02-08. “An interest in common is one owned by several persons not in joint 
ownership or partnership.  Every interest created in favor of several persons in their own right is 
an interest in common, unless acquired by them in partnership for partnership purposes, or unless 
declared in its creation to be a joint tenancy.”  Id. 
82. It is this ownership by the group that allowed property held by joint tenants to avoid the 
requirements of the wills acts when one of the members died.  Since nothing passed to the 
surviving joint tenant, it was unnecessary to effectuate the ownership in the survivors.  Although 
treated as owning nothing for property and probate purposes, the value of the jointly held property 
is still included in a decedent’s estate for purposes of determining the estate tax.  See I.R.C. 
§ 2040 (1981). 
83. 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 31.06(a) (David A. Thompson ed., 2d Thompson ed. 
2004).  The interest of each joint tenant must be acquired or vest at the same time; all joint tenants 
must acquire title by the same instrument; all tenants must have equal undivided shares and 
identical interests measure by duration; and each must have right to possession to the whole 
property.  The requirement for equal ownership is largely ignored in cases where it matters, i.e., if 
one of two joint tenants provides more than half of the capital necessary to acquire property, the 
court in a partition action would likely award the parties shares based on their actual contributions. 
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cause the ownership of the property to transmute to a tenancy in common.84  
Joint tenants could convert the joint tenancy to a tenancy in common at any 
time by destroying anyone of the four unities.85  Joint tenants could also 
bring partition actions against one another asking the court to either divide 
the property into physically separate parcels or that the property be sold 
with the proceeds split between the joint tenants. 
North Dakota, however, has long dispensed with the “Blackstonian” 
doctrine of the four unities and held that joint tenancy will exist when the 
conditions of the statute are met.86  Essentially, joint tenancy with right of 
survivorship is created when the owners of the property take title as joint 
tenant.87 
Many jurisdictions recognize tenancy by the entirety, a form of 
ownership similar to joint tenancy, for property jointly owned by spouses.88  
Tenancy by the entirety is a form of joint ownership that can exist solely 
between spouses.  It is similar to joint tenancy in that the property auto-
matically passes to the survivor on the death of one of the spouses.  This 
form essentially adds an additional unity to the four required for joint 
tenancy, i.e., the requirement that the joint owners be married to one 
another.  Tenants by the entirety face limitations on their ownership in that 
they may not change the ownership of the property without the consent of 
their spouses.  This means that the ownership cannot be defeated by trans-
ferring the interest of one spouse to another and that neither spouse has the 
right to seek judicial partition of the property.89  Tenancy by the entirety has 
never been recognized in North Dakota.90  States with tenancy by the 
entirety will often include it in their slayer statutes.91 
B. TREATMENT OF JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY UNDER THE SLAYER 
STATUTE 
Joint tenancy property has always presented a special case under 
application of the slayer statute.  Applying the slayer statute to property that 
was fully owned or controlled by the victim did not require taking property 
 
84. See Carson v. Ellis, 348 P.2d 807, 809 (Kan. 1960); Snyder v. Snyder, 212 N.W.2d 869, 
872 (Minn. 1973). 
85. This could be done by agreement of all the joint tenants, or by the action of a lone joint 
tenant by merely conveying his interest to a third party. 
86. Renz v. Renz, 256 N.W.2d 883, 885 (1977). 
87. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-06 (2007). 
88. Tenancy by the entirety is recognized in approximately fifty percent of jurisdictions. 
89. Any attempt by one spouse to transfer his or her interest in the property to a third party 
will be void. 
90. Renz, 256 N.W.2d at 885 (citing Schimke v. Karlstad, 208 N.W.2d 710 (1973)). 
91. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 112.475 (2005). 
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away from the killer.  The killer had, at best, an expectancy of receiving the 
property.  Expectancies are not property rights, so denying the killer the 
right to receive the property did not require courts to examine or even 
consider the effect the slayer statute had on the property rights of the killer.  
Because joint tenancy property represents the ownership of at least some 
interest in the underlying property by the killer, application of the slayer 
statute requires courts and legislatures to determine what, if any, impact the 
existence of this property interest should have on the disposition of the 
property. 
C. TREATMENT BY AUTHORITIES 
The UPC takes the position that the killing should be treated as a 
severance of the joint tenancy.92  The application of this provision was 
clearly demonstrated by North Dakota Supreme Court in Snortland.93  The 
district court had held that the killer retained an undivided interest as a 
tenant-in-common with his father’s estate in property that had been held by 
them as joint tenants with right of survivorship.94  The court took note of 
the various common law solutions to the slayer situation, but held that it 
was merely necessary to apply the statute since the legislature had provided 
specific relief by adopting the UPC version of the slayer statute.  The stat-
ute provided that when the killing of a joint tenant affects a severance of 
that tenancy, the severance of a joint tenancy results in the tenancy in 
common.95 
Of particular importance is the court’s footnote to this discussion.  The 
court states that, “A contrary result, awarding all of the joint tenancy 
property to the decedent’s estate, would work a forfeiture on the killer.”96  It 
then relates this forfeiture to common law attainders and ultimately to 
authority that such attainders have been abandoned under modern policies 
of law.97 
 
92. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(c)(2) (2006). 
93. In re Estate of Snortland, 311 N.W.2d 36, 37-39 (N.D. 1981).  The son, Robert E. 
Snortland, was later discovered to have died not long after killing his father.  Cole, supra note 7, 
at 4A.  This fact was unknown at the time of the Supreme Court decision.  Id.  
94. Snortland, 311 N.W.2d at 36.  The court applied North Dakota Century Code Section 
30.1-10-03(2), which at the time provided that: “Any joint tenant who feloniously and 
intentionally kills another joint tenant thereby effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so 
that the share of the decedent passes as his property and the killer has no rights by survivorship.”  
The language was taken from the Uniform Probate Code Section 2-803 (1969).  Id. 
95. Id. at 38 (citing Renz v. Renz, 256 N.W. 2d 883 (N.D. 1977)). 
96. Id. 
97. The North Dakota Constitution, Article I, Section 18, prohibits Bills of Attainder from 
being passed by the legislature.  North Dakota Century Code Section 12.1-33-02 also provides 
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However, the court did leave open the possibility that it would accept 
the forfeiture of the property via another method.  The estate of the dece-
dent argued that the court should apply the portion of the slayer statute that 
calls for the victim’s estate to be distributed as if the killer had predeceased 
the victim.98  If this were done, then the joint tenancy property would pass 
completely to the victim.  The court held, however, that because the legisla-
ture had provided a specific provision governing the disposition of joint 
tenancy property, that it was bound to follow that provision.99  Failing to do 
so would render the joint tenancy provision “nugatory.”100  The court then 
stated, “If the legislature had intended that joint tenancy property be gov-
erned by § 30.1-10-03(1), NDCC, it could have expressly provided so.”101  
The court does not provide any answer to the question of whether the 
legislature’s attempt to give the property completely to the victim would 
survive the scrutiny of the law as a forfeiture, but merely describes the 
statutory structure that had, in fact, been adopted. 
In dealing with joint tenancy property, the Restatement takes the 
position that the killer of a joint tenant retains a life estate in half the 
property.102  The estate of the victim will hold a life estate in the other half 
of the property and the remainder interest in the property.  In fact, the 
Restatement takes the position that treating the killing as effecting a 
severance of the joint tenancy requires some equitable justification.103  A 
severance is viewed as benefiting the killer at the expense of the estate of 
the victim.  In other words, prior to the killing, the killer only held a life 
estate and a possibility of receiving all the property on the death of the joint 
tenant.  Turning this possibility of a remainder in all of the property into 
 
that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a person convicted of a crime does not suffer . . . 
forfeiture of estate or property.” 
98. N.D. CENT. CODE 30.1-10-03(1) (2007). 
99. The dissent argues that “N.D.C.C. 30.1-10-03(1) is equally specific in prohibiting any 
killer from receiving ‘any benefits under the will or under Chapters 30.1-04 through 30.1-11’” and 
would have held that the killer should have been treated as predeceased, resulting in the property 
passing to the victim’s estate.  Id. at 39 (Pederson, J., dissenting).  This argument does not 
withstand scrutiny.  Chapters 30.1-04 through 30.1-11 do not provide any benefits to a joint tenant 
killer and joint tenancy property does not pass under a will.  The severance of a joint tenancy con-
verts the property to tenancy in common by operation of law, not under any statutory provision. 
100. Snortland, 311 N.W.2d at 39. 
101. Id. 
102. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 8.4 cmt. l; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 188 
cmt. b.  The Restatement of Restitution further provides that the killer holds the property in a 
constructive trust.  Presumably this constructive trust would exist to protect the interest of the 
estate of the victim in both its one half interest in the income of the property and the remainder 
interest in the entire property. 
103. The comment does provide that this justification is only necessary when the severance 
is not “dictated by statute.”  Presumably this means the Restatement supports the notion that 
severances can properly be required by statute, as is true under the UPC. 
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outright ownership in part of it gives the killer a greater property interest 
then he had.104 
D. TREATMENT IN THE VARIOUS STATES105 
The various states have produced a variety of results in dealing with 
joint tenancy property under their slayer statutes, whether common law or 
legislative. 
1. Killer’s Rights in Property Limited 
There is considerable support for the idea that a killer’s survivorship 
rights in the property of a co-owner/victim should be limited.106  The ration-
ale of the courts is that Principle of Public Policy dictates that no person 
should be permitted to profit by his own wrongdoing and that taking full 
ownership of the joint tenancy property would result in such a profit.107 
The method of actually limiting the right of the killer in the property is 
more challenging.  By operation of law, property that is held with right of 
survivorship passes to the surviving joint owner.  Simply taking the prop-
erty right away is something courts have been reluctant to do.108 One mech-
anism for overcoming this problem is the use of a constructive trust.  The 
killer still takes legal title to the entire property as the survivor, but does so 
subject to a constructive trust which obligates the killer to hold a portion of 
the property for the benefit of others. 
Courts that employ constructive trusts generally provide little 
discussion beyond the equitable maxims that underlie its use.  In Neiman v. 
 
104. While the victim was still alive the killer could have caused a severance and received 
outright ownership of a portion of the property, but a court is certainly under no obligation to give 
a killer the benefit of what he could have done. 
105. Cases dealing with the common law application of the slayer statute must either come 
from an era prior to the adoption of the state’s legislature of a slayer statute or in a situation where 
the court found the slayer statute inapplicable to the facts before, requiring the application of the 
common law. 
106. Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Felonious Killing of One Cotenant or Tenant by the 
Entireties by the other as Affecting the Latter’s Right in the Property, 42 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1125-29 
(1972 & Supp. 2007) (citing cases from seventeen jurisdictions that imposed limitations on 
survivorship rights in joint tenant and tenancy by the entirety cases). 
107. Id. at 1129 (citing Barnett v. Couey, 27 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930)). 
108. Johansen v. Pelton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 625, 632 (1970). 
To deprive the heirs of the slayer of all interest in the property is to embrace a policy 
which tends to work a forfeiture, attainder, or corruption of the blood, with respect to 
the property interest which the surviving malefactor had at the instant before the 
slaying, and which, except for intervention on the theory adopted by the trial court, 
would have passed to his heirs. 
Id. 
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Hurff,109 the Supreme Court of New Jersey dealt with the estate of a woman 
who had been killed by her husband.  The wife had named a charity as her 
sole beneficiary and it sought ownership of the couple’s jointly held prop-
erty.  The trial court held that the husband took the property as trustee for 
himself and the charity.110  The husband’s interest was limited to an income 
interest in one-half the property.  While the court felt that it would be 
“abhorrent” to allow the husband to retain title to the property, it felt that 
divesting him of all legal title “violates or does violence to the doctrine of 
vested rights” and would conflict with the state’s statutory prohibitions on 
corruption of blood and forfeiture.111  The court then held, however, that 
use of the constructive trust allowed the court to avoid conflict with both 
vested legal rights and the statutory prohibitions.  “The doctrine is so con-
sistent with the equitable principles that have obtained here for centuries 
that we have no hesitancy in applying it.”112  The court felt limited, how-
ever, in the extent it could use those equitable powers.  Granting all 
equitable interest in the property to the charity would require depriving the 
killer of the right he held as a joint tenant to use of the property for his 
lifetime.113  The court felt that since the killer had prevented the determi-
nation of the natural order of the deaths of himself and his wife, equity 
required a presumption that she would have outlived him.114 
The Supreme Court of Illinois solved the problem by finding that the 
very act of killing caused a severance of the joint tenancy even in the 
absence of a statute mandating that result.  In Bradley v. Fox,115 the court 
dealt with a husband who killed his wife.116  The husband and the wife’s 
daughter from a prior marriage both made claims to the couple’s joint 
tenancy property.117  In the prior decision of Welsh v. James118 the Illinois 
Supreme Court had held that a husband who had killed his wife was entitled 
 
109. 93 A.2d 345 (N.J. 1952). 
110. Id. at 346. 
111. Id. at 347. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. “Equity therefore conclusively presumes for the purpose of working out justice that the 
decedent would have survived the wrongdoer.”  Id. at 348. 
115. 129 N.E.2d 699 (Ill. 1955). 
116. Bradley, 129 N.E.2d at 701. 
117. Id.  The daughter also filed a wrongful death action against her mother’s husband that 
had been dismissed by the lower court because the husband, as one of the class of beneficiaries 
under the wrongful death act, was prohibited from maintaining an action for damages that he had 
caused.  Id. at 702.  The court overruled the trial court and allowed the daughter’s tort suit to 
continue.  Id. 
118. 95 N.E.2d 872 (Ill. 1950). 
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to the entire property which they had held in joint tenancy.119  That 
decision, however, was based on the legal fiction that a joint tenant was 
“seized of the whole estate” and could not be divested “without violating 
the constitutional mandate against corruption of blood or forfeiture of 
estate.”120  The court concluded that the authorities relied upon in Welsh did 
not, in fact, mandate that conclusion.121  They decided that stare decisis was 
not applicable and visited the question anew. 
On reexamination, the court held that the prohibition of forfeiture was 
simply not applicable.  The court began with the acceptance of the broad 
policy that a murderer should not enjoy the fruits of his crime.122  The court 
then noted that the forfeiture question had been considered in numerous 
forums dealing with the question of whether legislative slayer statutes were 
enforceable.  The court also noted that the slayers statutes “have been 
uniformly sustained on the theory that they do not deprive the murderer of 
his property, but merely prevent him from acquiring additional property in 
an unauthorized and unlawful way.”123 
Having determined that forfeiture did not prohibit altering the rights of 
the killing joint tenant, the court went on to consider the correct course to 
take.  The court gave consideration to each of the possibilities and noted 
that the use of a constructive trust was urged by “legal scholars” and the 
Restatement of Restitution.124  The court found it unnecessary, however, to 
use such a trust.  Instead, the court gave a closer examination to the nature 
of joint tenancy.  It found joint tenancy to be in the nature of the contract.  
Further, an implied condition of the contract was that neither party would 
acquire the interest of the other by murder.  When the killer committed the 
murder, he violated this implied condition and this destroyed the unities of 
joint tenancy.125  The destruction of one of the unities resulted in the 
conversion of the property to tenancy in common.126 
 
119. Welsh, 95 N.E.2d at 875.  The facts of the Welsh case were not entirely on point because 
under Welsh the husband who had murdered his wife was judged to be insane when he committed 
the act.  Id. at 873. 
120. Bradley, 129 N.E.2d at 702. 
121. Id. at 703. 
122. Bradley, 129 N.E.2d at 704.  At the time, Illinois had adopted the slayer statute 
suggested by Professor Wade that prohibited a murderer from inheriting.  See Wade, supra note 
40, at 716.  The court correctly noted that the statute was not applicable to joint tenancy property, 
but did cite it as support for the broad policy of the state.  Bradley, 129 N.E.2d at 704. 
123. Bradley, 129 N.E.2d at 114. 
124. Id. at 704-05 (citing JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY & 
MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 310, 321 (1913); GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW 
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 478; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 188(b)). 
125. The court does not specify which of the unities—interest, title, time or possession—was 
destroyed by the killing.  It simply jumps to its conclusion that the killer had “by his felonious act, 
      
1016 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:997 
2. Killer’s Rights in Property Unaffected 
The courts of four jurisdictions have taken the position that the 
survivorship rights of a killer should be unaffected by the murder.127  These 
courts felt bound to follow property law and give ownership of the property 
to the surviving joint tenant. 
In Woodson v. Foster,128 the Supreme Court of Kansas upheld the 
vesting of the entire title in joint tenancy property to a husband who had 
killed his joint tenant/wife.129  At this time, Kansas had adopted a slayer 
statute that prevented any person convicted of feloniously killing another 
from inheriting by will or otherwise.  The court ruled that joint tenancy 
property was not a part of an estate and could not properly be characterized 
as inherited.130  Therefore, the slayer statute did not apply.  Most impor-
tantly, the court ruled that the interests of the joint tenants in the property 
vest upon the original conveyance.  Because the husband had a vested 
interest, it was improper for property law to take the property away.131  The 
same court specifically rejected, a decade later, the possibility of using a 
constructive trust to achieve the same result in equity that it rejected in 
law.132  Courts from Colorado,133 Illinois,134 and Tennessee135 have reached 
similar results. 
 
destroyed all rights of survivorship and lawfully retained only the title to his undivided one-half 
interest in the property.”  Bradley, 129 N.E.2d at 705-06. 
126. “It is our conclusion that Fox by his felonious act, destroyed all rights of survivorship 
and lawfully retained only the title to his undivided one-half interest in the property in dispute as a 
tenant in common. . . .”  Bradley, 129 N.E.2d at 706. 
127. Purver, supra note 106, § 6 (citing cases from Colorado, Illinois, Kansas and 
Tennessee).  Pennsylvania courts held that under the common law killers were not prevented from 
participating in the estates of theirs victims.  The Pennsylvania legislature subsequently adopted a 
slayer statute that provided for the severance of joint tenancy property, with both the victim’s 
estate and killer taking part of the property.  In Re Estate of Larendon, 266 A.2d 763, 767 (Penn. 
1970). 
128. 320 P.2d 855 (Kan. 1958). 
129. Woodson, 320 P.2d at 856. 
130. Id. at 860.  Under joint tenancy the survivor takes the property under the term of the 
original conveyance and not under the laws of intestate succession.  Id. 
131. Id.  The court implied that it might have been acceptable for the legislature to amend the 
slayer statute to affect the interests of a killer-joint tenant, but it gives no indication of whether it 
meant merely limiting the interests of the killer or denying it entirely.  Id.  “Although a theory 
depriving a murderer of any benefits resulting from his crime appeals to our sense of justice and 
equity, we are not permitted to read something into the statute which is not there.”  Id. 
132. United Trust Co. v. Pyke, 427 P.2d 67, 77 (Kan. 1967). 
133. Smith v. Greenburg, 218 P.2d 514, 519 (Colo. 1950) (“[W]e believe it may properly be 
said that the creation of joint tenancies and the disposition of property thereunder is dictated as 
strictly by pertinent legislation as is the devolution of property under the laws of descent and 
distribution.”). 
134. Welsh v. James, 95 N.E.2d 872, 875 (Ill. 1950) (“There is no law in this State that 
deprives appellee of his vested right in the whole of the estate as the surviving joint tenant.”). 
135. Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 100 S.W. 108, 111 (Tenn. 1907) 
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3. Killer’s Rights in Property Eliminated 
Because the new North Dakota slayer statute has taken the position that 
the killer’s interest in joint tenancy property should be voided, a close 
examination of the states that have a similar rule is important.  Only a few 
jurisdictions reportedly take the position that a killer should be denied all 
rights in the property held jointly with the victim.136  However, most of the 
cited cases show courts avoiding forfeiture issues by reaching the results of 
forfeiture through other legal means.137 
In Estate of Castiglioni v. Del Pozo,138 the California appellate court 
dealt with the disposition of bank accounts and real property held jointly by 
a woman and the husband she killed.139  The court held that the wife was 
not entitled to receive the joint tenancy property.140  It did not do so, how-
ever, through application of a slayer statute.  In fact, the court clearly states 
that “we have squarely held the joint tenancy property is to be divided 
equally between the estates of the victim and the murderer.”141  The court 
denied the wife any right in the funds by holding that principles of tracing 
and reimbursement were applicable in determining the property interests of 
the victim and the killer.142  In essence, the court did not rule that the slayer 
statute prevented the killer from taking a continuing interest in the property, 
but that the property in question was really not joint tenancy property.143 
 
It was not the intention of the General Assembly that vested rights of this character 
should be forfeited by the murderous act of the owner therein stated.  It was only 
intended that he should not in any way acquire any new rights or property interest 
from others as the result of his crime.  Any other construction of the statute would 
render it void. 
Id. 
136. The Restatement cites cases from California, Ohio and West Virginia.  RESTATEMENT 
OF PROPERTY § 8.4 cmt. 1.  American Law Reports cites Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Montana.  Purver, supra note 106, at 1154-57. 
137. See, e.g., In re Gatto’s Estate, 74 Pa. D. & C. 529, 538 (Orphans’ Ct. 1950) (ruling that 
the victims estate took all of the joint tenancy property when the killer committed suicide and 
actually died before the victim). 
138. 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
139. Estate of Castiglioni, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289-90. 
140. Id. at 290. 
141. Id. at 296. 
142. Id.  The court used provisions of the Probate Code regarding the identification of 
separate and community property in holding that placing the funds in a joint tenancy account was 
insufficient to convert the funds from the separate property of the decedent to joint tenancy 
property.  Id.  The court similarly used portions of the Family Code allowing tracing in divorce to 
identify separate and community property.  Id. at 301.  While the court acknowledged that the 
Family Code was not applicable to the case before it, the court ruled that there were “strong 
indicia” of legislative intent to allow rebuttal of joint tenancy presumptions.  Id. at 302. 
143. For a comparison, see Vesey v. Vesey, 54 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1952). 
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In In re Estate of Fiore,144  the Ohio Court of Appeals did allow the 
joint tenancy property to pass in its entirety to the victim’s estate.145  The 
case involved the disposition of funds in a joint tenancy bank account held 
by Charles DiPrima and Leonard Fiore.146  Mr. DiPrima pled no contest to 
the charge of murdering Mr. Fiore.147  The probate court awarded all prop-
erty in the joint and survivorship account to the estate of the victim.148  The 
appellate court upheld the decision.149  Ohio’s slayer statute did not address 
joint tenancy property directly, but did provide that the killer could not “in 
any way benefit by the death.”150  Further, the court ruled that the State’s 
constitutional prohibition on forfeiture of property by those convicted of a 
crime did not apply.151  This result, however, hinged on the fact that the 
joint tenancy property in question was a bank account in which both owners 
had the right to withdraw all the funds.  The killer’s rights to the account 
simply were not vested because “either party had full power at any 
time . . . , by withdrawals, to extinguish any rights of the other party.”152  
The reasoning of the court could not apply to real property, where one joint 
tenant is incapable of extinguishing the rights of the other. 
In Lakatos v. Billotti,153 the West Virginia Appellate Court dealt with 
real property held jointly by married couple.154  The husband killed his wife 
and shortly thereafter conveyed the property to his mother.155  The husband 
was convicted of the murders and sentenced to life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole.156  The circuit court held that the estate of the vic-
tim had no interest in the property.157  The court overturned its prior ruling.  
Although the state’s slayer statute had no specific language dealing with 
joint tenancy property, the court ruled that it was “unthinkable that our 
[L]egislature contemplated giving the fruits of his crime to one who 
 
144. 476 N.E.2d 1093 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). 
145. In re Estate of Fiore, 476 N.E.2d at 1095. 
146. The court was unable to establish how much the killer and victim had individually 




150. Id. at 1096 (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 2105.19(A)). 
151. Id. at 1097. 
152. Id. (citing Bauman v. Hague, 116 N.E.2d 439 (1953)). 
153. 509 S.E.2d 594 (W. Va. 1998). 
154. Lakotas, 509 S.E.2d at 595. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. (citing State ex rel. Miller v. Sencindiver, 275 S.E.2d 10 (1980)).  The circuit court 
felt that it was bound by an earlier decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court which held that 
the state slayer statute did require divestment of any right in joint tenancy property.  Id. 
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commits a homicide.”158  The result denying property to the killer was 
“inherent in the statute” dealing with joint property.159  The court’s opinion 
did not, however, discuss the nature of the killer’s interest in the property or 
deal with the impact that forfeiture might have on the decision. 
Of particular interest in the Lakatos decision is the fact that it cites the 
Montana case of In re Cox Estate160 as supporting its conclusion.  Unfortu-
nately, the case provides no such support.  In Cox, the Supreme Court of 
Montana dealt with property held jointly by a husband and wife.  The 
husband killed his wife and then committed suicide.161  The district court 
held that the husband took all the property because he survived his wife, 
albeit by only a short time, and the property was a part of his estate.162  The 
district court, however, imposed a constructive trust on the interests of the 
wife in the property for the benefit of her heirs.  The supreme court upheld 
the imposition of this constructive trust.163  The interest held by the husband 
was not covered by this constructive trust and its ownership were not the 
subject of the appeal to the supreme court.  Thus, the Cox case did not 
support the ruling of the Lakatos court in denying any interest to the 
killer.164 
Bierbauer v. Moran165 represents the clearest application of the denial 
of an interest in joint tenancy property to a killer.  The case dealt with a 
husband who murdered his wife and then committed suicide.166  The court 
was dealing with the question of whether the heirs of the wife or the heirs of 
the husband should receive the property.  The court held that it would be 
improper to allow the “willful killing of the wife by the husband” to result 
in property going to his estate because “his estate would profit by his 
 
158. Id. at 597. 
159. Id.  
160. 380 P.2d 584 (Mont. 1963). 
161. In re Cox Estate, 380 P.2d at 585. 
162. Id. at 585-86. 
163. Id. at 591. 
164. The Montana Supreme Court revised the issue in Sikora v. Sikora, a case cited by 
American Law Reports, as denying a killer joint tenant of the right to share in the estate of joint 
tenancy.  499 P.2d 808, 811 (1972).  A close reading of the case, however, shows that it simply 
upholds the decision in Cox denying the killer an interest in the “share of the joint property owned 
by” the victim.  Id. at 811. 
165. 279 N.Y.S. 176 (App. Div. 1935). 
166. Id. at 178-79.  The fact of the killing made the then applicable simultaneous death 
statute inapplicable because the order of death was clearly ascertainable.  If the statute had 
applied, the property would have been split between the two estates as if the decedents had been 
tenants in common.  Id.  Under a modern simultaneous death statute, the decedents would be 
treated as having died simultaneously despite the fact that the order of death could be determined.  
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-702 (2006). 
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crime.”167  The property was awarded entirely to the heirs of the wife.168  
The court did not discuss what interests the husband might have had in the 
property of why those rights could be terminated. 
E. NORTH DAKOTA’S NEW STATUTE 
The North Dakota Legislature amended its slayer statute in 2007 to 
provide that the interest of the killer in property held with the decedent as 
joint tenancy with the right of survivorship is voided.169  The new North 
Dakota slayer statute only changes the treatment of joint tenancy.170  So, 
while the killer’s heirs will still take under intestacy, application of the anti-
lapse statute, or as takers in default of a power of appointment, they will be 
denied the ability to inherit the joint tenancy property. 
The legislature retained the subsequent provision in the North Dakota 
Century Code that provides protection to third-party purchasers for value of 
an interest in the property that had a good-faith reliance on the apparent title 
by survivorship in the killer.171  Interestingly, this section does not provide 
that the proceeds of such a sale in the hands of the killer will become the 
property of the decedent’s estate.  Successors to the decedent’s estate would 
presumably have to pursue the proceeds of the sale by filing a suit, probably 
in wrongful death, against the killer. 
The new North Dakota slayer statute does not discuss or justify the 
removal of property rights in the joint tenancy property from the killer.  
North Dakota now becomes the first state to explicitly attempt to cancel all 
interests of a killing joint tenant in the joint tenancy property.  Cancelling 
 
167. Bierbauer, 279 N.Y.S. at 179.  The court did cite the principle that “no man shall be 
permitted to profit by his own wrong” and held that this principle applies to a wrongdoer’s estate 
as well as to himself.  Id. 
168. The decision was followed in In re Estate of Bobula, 25 App. Div. 2d 241 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1966), rev’d on other grounds, 227 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1966).  Again, the opinion did not 
include any discussion of the killer’s property rights. 
169. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03 (2007). “The intentional and felonious killing of the 
decedent: . . . (b) voids the interests of the killer in property held with the decedent  at the time of 
the killing as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.”  Id. § 30.1-10-03(3)(b). 
170. Other than the changes made to the treatment of joint tenancy property, North Dakota 
Century Code Section 30.1-10-03 uses the language contained in UPC Section 2-803. 
171.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-04 (2007). The voided interest 
under subdivision b of subsection 2 does not affect any third-party interest in property 
acquired for value and in good-faith reliance on an apparent title by survivorship . . . 
[in the killer] unless a writing declaring the . . . [voided interest] has been noted, 
registered, filed, or recorded in records appropriate to the kind and location of the 
property which are relied upon, in the ordinary course of transactions involving such 
property, as evidence of ownership. 
Id. § 30.1-10-04(3). 
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property interests by law raises the very real question of whether forfeiture 
has taken place, and if so, whether the forfeiture is allowed. 
IV. FORFEITURE 
Forfeiture occurs when a person is deprived of property because of the 
commission of some act.172  Punishing a prisoner through the forfeiture of 
property is generally disfavored under the law of the United States.173  
North Dakota prohibits the forfeiture of a criminal’s estate upon a convic-
tion.174  While some states contain similar provisions in their state constitu-
tions,175 North Dakota does so by legislative act.  This statute is, however, 
related to the prohibitions on bills of attainder in the United States and 
North Dakota constitutions.176  These provisions all deal with the treatment 
of a convicted criminal’s property and are deeply rooted in history. 
Attainder applied to a person convicted of a capital felony.177  
Attainder could be described as the extinction of person’s “civil rights” at 
the same time as he is sentenced to death.178  The attainder resulted in the 
criminal forfeiting all land and chattels, corruption of the blood.179  This 
attainder comprised an additional component to the criminal’s punishment 
for the crime.  The criminal’s execution meant that the burden of the for-
feiture fell on the criminal’s heirs, who were denied their inheritance of the 
criminal’s lands and chattels.  Corruption of the blood further prevented the 
issue of the criminal from inheriting from the convicted person any property 
that was not forfeited. 
 
172. Forfeiture: “2. The loss of a right, privilege, or property because of a crime, breach of 
obligation, or neglect of duty.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 677 (8th ed. 2004). 
173. The federal judiciary is prohibited from imposing forfeiture or corruption of blood as a 
punishment for treason except during the life of the person who committed the treason.  U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. 
174. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-33-02 (2007).  “Except as otherwise provided by law, a 
person convicted of a crime does no suffer civil death or corruption of blood or sustain loss of 
civil rights for forfeiture of estate or property, but retains all of his rights, political, personal, civil 
and otherwise. . . .”  Id. 
175. See, e.g., TENN. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“No corruption of blood or forfeiture of estates.”). 
The Tennessee Supreme Court has ruled that any statute that would deprive a joint tenant of any 
interest in the property as a result of committing murder would be void as forfeiture because of 
this provision.  Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 100 S.W. 108, 111 (Tenn. 1907). 
176. U.S. CONST. art. I , §§ 9, 10; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 18. 
177. Reppy, supra note 9, at 231. 
178. Jacob Reynolds, The Rule of Law and the Origins of the Bill of Attainder Clause, 18 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 177, 182 (2005). 
179. Reppy, supra note 9, at 231.  Attainder also resulted in “civil death,” essentially the 
denial of access to the courts.  Id.  A similar forfeiting of property under escheat also could apply 
to one who was attained.  Id. at 233.  If the king failed to claim the property forfeited, it could not 
descend to the criminal’s heirs because of the corruption of the blood, with the result being that it 
would escheat to the criminal’s lord.  Id. at 233-34. 
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The judicial concept of attainder is distinct, though related, to the 
legislative action of a bill of attainder.180  Legislative bodies adopted bills of 
attainder to inflict additional penalty on an individual, usually one who had 
committed treason or some other serious felony.181  Both the courts and the 
Congress maintained the possibility of imposing attainder, so the United 
States Constitution outlaws attainder in both Article I and Article III.182 
Forfeiture and corruption of the blood existed in feudal England and 
were not abolished until late in the nineteenth century.  The abolishment 
began in 1814 with the provision that corruption of blood should not extend 
to new statutory felonies,183 and culminated with the passage of the Statute 
of Forfeitures for Treason and Felony passed in 1870.184  As discussed 
earlier, the abolition of forfeiture and corruption of the blood gave rise to 
the need for slayer statutes.185 
The abolition of forfeiture does not mean, however, that a criminal may 
not be required to forfeit property as punishment for committing a crime.  
Beginning in 1970 with the passages of the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act186 and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act,187 Congress introduced the concept of property for-
feiture as a penalty for criminal convictions in some situations.188  Modern 
criminal forfeiture differs from attainder in that the property forfeited still 
must bear some relationship to the crime committed.189  These criminal 
forfeitures do not fall under the constitutional prohibition because they do 
not apply to treason,190 and are not bills of attainder.191 
 
180. Reynolds, supra note 177, at 182. 
181. Id. 
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10, art. III, § 3. 
183. Reppy, supra note 9 at 234-35. 
184. Id. at 238. 
185. See discussion infra Part II. 
186. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1963 (1970). 
187. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1970). 
188. The use of criminal forfeiture on the federal level has expanded since with the passage 
of a general forfeiture statute that has been used to target a variety of different criminal acts.  See 
Ford, supra note 18, at 1405. 
189. Id. at 1406-07. 
190. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (applying to the judiciary and only prohibiting corruption of 
blood and forfeiture during the life of a person committing treason under a declaration of 
Congress). 
191. Bills of attainder are acts “of the legislature proposed and passed as any other bill, but 
for the specific purpose of attainting individuals. . . .”  Reynolds, supra note 177, at 182. 
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Criminal forfeitures must be distinguished from civil forfeitures.192  A 
criminal forfeiture comes out of a proceeding against a person for a criminal 
act.  A civil forfeiture is an action in rem against the piece of property that 
was used in the commission of a crime or acquired as the result of criminal 
activity.193  “It is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to 
a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious 
instead of inanimate and insentient.”194  Civil forfeiture is a result of spe-
cific authorizing statutes and requires a lower burden of proof than criminal 
forfeiture.195  Most importantly, because civil forfeiture is not based on the 
criminal culpability of any person, it is not considered punishment on a 
person.196 
The difference between in rem and criminal forfeiture has procedural 
implications as well.  Criminal forfeitures require higher levels of due proc-
ess and can implicate other constitutional rights.197  Civil forfeitures carry 
lower due process requirements, but the establishment of the fact that the 
property is subject to forfeiture is still required.198 
A criminal forfeiture still might not trigger all the safeguards that exist 
under the Constitution for criminal trials.199  In Kennedy, the United States 
Supreme Court has provided guidelines in determining whether a particular 
provision is so punitive that it may only be imposed after a criminal 
prosecution. 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether 
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its opera-
tion will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution 
and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already 
a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally 
 
192. While criminal forfeitures were absent from American law for almost two centuries 
after the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, the use of civil forfeiture “developed expansively.”  
Ford, supra note 18, at 1403-04. 
193. J. Andrew Vines, United States v. Ursery: The Supreme Court Refuses to Extend 
Double Jeopardy Protection to Civil in rem Forfeiture, 50 ARK. L. REV. 797, 805 (1998). 
194. Waterloo Distilling Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931). 
195. See id. (providing a full discussion of civil forfeiture and its case history). 
196. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 273 (1996). 
197. Among the constitutional rights that can be implicated are: double jeopardy, the right 
against self-incrimination, and the right to an attorney.  See Douglas Kim, Note and Comment, 
Asset Forfeiture: Giving Up Your Constitutional Rights, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 527, 561-78 
(1997). 
198. Id. at 539. 
199. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 184-86 (1963). 
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be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive 
in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant.200 
Applying these standards, the Supreme Court has both struck down and 
allowed provisions.201 
Cases applying a slayer statute have often dealt with the question of 
whether forfeiture has been imposed on the killer.  Most of these cases, 
however, involve a killer’s attempt to continue to inherit property owned by 
the victim.  Courts have consistently held that denying a killer the right to 
inherit property from a victim does not work forfeiture.  Forfeiture can only 
occur when property of the killer is taken away.  Since killers have at best 
an expectancy of receiving property from the victim, it is not forfeiture to 
thwart that expectation.  The new North Dakota slayer statute requires a 
new examination of the concept of forfeiture. 
V. ANALYSIS 
The threshold question in examining the new North Dakota slayer 
statute is whether it results in a forfeiture of the killer’s property at all.  The 
courts that have examined slayer statutes in multiple jurisdictions have 
determined that they did not result in forfeiture.202  These cases, however, 
usually dealt with the general application of the slayer statute to prevent 
killers from inheriting any portion of the victim’s estate, rather then with 
denying them something that the killer already owned. 
The new North Dakota slayer statute not only prevents a killer from 
taking over the victim’s interest in property held in joint tenancy, but also 
deprives the killer from any interest in the property.  The revision is unique 
as it represents the first legislative attempt to use a slayer statute to com-
pletely deprive a killing joint tenant of any right in the property.203  Both the 
 
200. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted). 
201. Id. at 148-86 (invalidating a statute that stripped the citizenship from any person 
remained outside of the United States to avoid military service during time of war); Wong Wing v. 
United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235-38 (1896) (invalidating a statute that required aliens to be held 
for one year at hard labor before being deported); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1986) 
(upholding statute that provided for civil commitment of “sexually dangerous persons”); United 
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-51 (1980) (upholding statute that imposed civil penalties on 
parties discharging hazardous substances). 
202. Bradley v. Fox, 129 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ill. 1955) (upholding the slayer statute on the 
ground that it does “not deprive the murderer of property, but merely prevent[s] him from 
acquiring additional property in an unauthorized and unlawful way”); Neiman v. Hurff, 93 A.2d 
345, 347 (N.J. 1952) (applying the slayer statute “does not interfere with vested legal rights”); see 
also Purver, supra note 106, § 8. 
203. Two courts have ruled that legislatures have done so indirectly by providing that a killer 
should be treated as having predeceased the victim.  See cases cited supra note 152 and 164.  They 
ruled that using that fiction, the victim survived the killer and took full ownership of the property 
as the surviving joint tenant.  Id. 
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Restatement and the UPC, by providing a life estate in the property to the 
killer or by severing the joint tenancy, have taken the position that de-
priving the killer of all interest in the property is improper. 
The fact that no other jurisdiction or authority has gone as far as North 
Dakota in applying the Principle of Public Policy does not, by itself, mean 
that the new North Dakota slayer statute should not be adopted.  What is 
vital, however, is that the new position be carefully assessed to ensure that 
other important legal principles will not be sacrificed.  The new North 
Dakota slayer statute deprives a person of property and therefore must be 
consistent with the general principle disfavoring the taking of property.  
But, how does the statute take property and what is the significance of that 
method? 
The new North Dakota slayer statute clearly causes the killer to lose 
property.  The killer owns a property interest.  This interest became fully 
vested at the time of the original conveyance of the property into joint ten-
ancy.  The new North Dakota slayer statute deprives the killer of the con-
tinued ownership and enjoyment of the property despite the fact that the 
killer satisfies the only pre-condition under property law, being alive. This 
is forfeiture. 
While forfeitures can be either criminal or civil, the new North Dakota 
statute does not fit within the definition of a civil forfeiture.  The property 
being forfeited, the killer’s previously held interest in the joint tenancy 
property, is not the fruits of criminal activity and was not a part of the 
criminal activity.204  Further, taking results because of a determination by a 
court that the killer had “feloniously and intentionally” killed another.  
Given the fact that the property taken from the killer does not have to be 
involved in the killing, it appears that the forfeiture cannot be deemed in 
rem.  This leaves the only conclusion that the forfeiture is criminal in 
nature, i.e., a punishment for the commission of a crime.  If the property is 
not “guilty” of a crime, then taking it from the owner must be because of 
the in personam actions of the person owning the property.  “A civil sanc-
tion that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather 
can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes 
is punishment, as we have come to understand that term.”205  This makes 
the forfeiture under the new North Dakota slayer statute criminal in nature. 
 
204. United States v. Usery, 282 U.S. 267, 294 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The 
theory is that the property, whether or not illegal or dangerous in nature, is hazardous in the hands 
of this owner because either he uses it to commit crimes, or allows others to do so.”). 
205. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989). 
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Even as a criminal forfeiture, the new North Dakota slayer statute must 
be assessed to determine if it triggers full constitutional protections.  Sev-
eral of these Kennedy factors triggering full constitutional protection clearly 
exist in the case of the new North Dakota slayer statute.206  Others are 
difficult to assess without knowing exactly what the legislature intended in 
adopting the new rule.207 
The North Dakota Legislature may have had many motives in passing 
the new North Dakota slayer statute: As a preventative measure to discour-
age killing; as a punishment for killers; to provide for compensation for the 
heirs and devisees of the victim other than the killers.  The North Dakota 
Legislature did not label its new slayer statute as a forfeiture, either civil or 
criminal.  This perhaps is owing to the belief that it was merely amending a 
property law. 
Whatever the intent of the North Dakota Legislature, it seems clear that 
the new North Dakota slayer statute is a forfeiture of property held by the 
killer.  While criminal forfeitures are perfectly allowed, they must be ac-
companied by the procedural protections governing any criminal punish-
ment.  Even if application of the Kennedy factors would not trigger full due 
process, at least some protections would have to be provided.  The new 
North Dakota slayer statute clearly lacks these protections. 
Criminal forfeitures, like all criminal sanctions, can only be imple-
mented with all of the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments.208  These safeguards are clearly denied in the 
 
206. The new North Dakota slayer statute clearly requires a finding of scienter, the behavior 
penalized is already a crime.  The discussion of forfeiture supra at Section IV shows that denying 
a convicted individual of his property has also historically been considered punishment for a 
crime, though the rise of civil forfeiture may mean that this is no longer the case. 
207. Any forfeiture or penalty could promote the traditional aims of retribution and 
deterrence.   Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (citing United States v. 
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1963) and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98, 111-12 (Brennan, J., 
concurring).  The legislature did not attempt to connect any purpose to the rule, so it is difficult to 
determine whether such purpose is rational.  Whether the penalty might be excessive will vary 
greatly on a case by case basis. 
208. The Fifth Amendment reads:  
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on 
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger, 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
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implementation of the new North Dakota slayer statute.  The killer’s “guilt” 
is determined by a court, not by a jury.  The standard for the finding is a 
preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.  The sanc-
tion can be implemented even if the killer died before the proceeding 
begins, so the killer would be denied any opportunity to present a defense. 
While it is unlikely that the new North Dakota slayer statute can pass 
constitutional muster, that does not mean that heirs of victims are without 
recourse.  They have the same rights to prevent unjust enrichment by killers 
that existed prior to the recent amendment.  A wrongful death suit can be 
filed against the killer or killer’s estate and assuming the facts are proven, a 
judgment will issue.  The victim’s heirs can then assert this claim against 
the killer or killer’s estate in the same manner as any other creditor. 
The new North Dakota slayer statute fails equitable standards in other 
ways as well.  While the assumption has been that only the killer, the vic-
tim, and their heirs are involved, this will not always be the case.  Property 
held by any person or estate can be pursued by creditors.  The new North 
Dakota slayer statute deprives the creditors of the killer from a source from 
which they could seek compensation for their claims. 
The UPC and the Restatement have both provided systems for dealing 
with joint tenancy property held by killers and their victims.  In both cases 
the rights of the killer have been protected by ensuring that only killers’ 
chances to obtain more property than that which they already own will be 
affected by the killing.  The Principle of Public Policy really asks for 
nothing more.  The new North Dakota slayer statute, by crossing the line 
between denying a killer the chance to receive new property and taking the 
killer’s existing property has turned the slayer statute into an instrumen-
tality of criminal punishment. 
While the North Dakota Legislature may have been trying to prevent 
situations that could be deemed “absurd,” it did so by trampling the rights 
of the killer in a way that is not justified under the U.S. Constitution.  The 
new North Dakota slayer statute should be repealed and either UPC or 
Restatement versions of the slayer statute adopted. 
 
 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
